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Abstract
Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgement; un-
der conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is
won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We com-
pare conditional and contingent fees in a principal-agent framework
where the lawyer chooses unobservable effort after she has observed
the amount at stake. Contingent fees provide better incentives than
conditional fees independently of whether upfront payments are re-
stricted to be non-negative or not. Under contingent fees the attorney
uses her information about what is at stake more efficiently.
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1 Introduction
In a typical tort case in the United States the plaintiff’s attorney receives
her compensation in form of a contingent fee. Under this payment scheme
the attorney gets a share of the judgements if her client wins and nothing if
her client loses. A common practice is to use a sliding scale: the attorney
gets one-third if the case is settled without trial, 40% if the plaintiff wins at
trial, and 50% if a judgement for the plaintiff is affirmed on appeal.
The use of contingent legal fees is by now widespread in the US. In a well-
known empirical study, Kritzer (1990) presents suggestive data. He observes
that individual litigants tend to use contingent fees, and they are mostly used
in torts (more than 87%) and contracts (around 53%), whereas hourly fees
are essentially used in divorce and other domestic issues. These figures have
been confirmed and discussed in later studies by Kritzer (2002) himself as
well as by Brickman (2003a, 2003b).
In Europe the picture is quite different. Contingent legal fees are strictly
forbidden (pactum cuota litis is not allowed by the ethical code of the Eu-
ropean association of lawyers), albeit evidence that in some countries they
have been unofficial practice. Nevertheless, market pressure has led some
countries to allow conditional fees. Under conditional fees the lawyer gets
an upscale premium if the case is won. This premium is not related to the
amount adjudicated. The United Kingdom started introducing conditional
fees in the nineties1, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands, the latter
now considering to formally allow contingent fees. Spain, France, Italy, and
Portugal are considering the introduction of conditional fees. Germany has
also relaxed some restrictions by means of third party contingent contracts,
though not to the extreme of accepting conditional fees (Kirstein and Rick-
man, 2004).
We may say that the type of contract for legal fees has been changing
rapidly all over Europe, clearly following the US tendency, but still not to
1More precisely, in 1997, the Scottish model of speculative actions, where a lawyer
receives the normal fee only when successful, was extended to England and Wales with a
provision that a lawyer can charge an extra percentage of those fees to reflect the risk of
not being paid. Before 1997, conditional fees were used in personal injury, insolvency and
cases to the European Court of Human Rights only, and in 1997 were extended to most
civil cases (Yarrow, 2001).
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the point of allowing contingent fees. We should not, however, neglect that
contingent as well as conditional fees have raised some antagonism among le-
gal scholars (See, 1984; Kurzlik, 1999; Kritzer, 2002; Zander, 2002; Brickman
2003a, 2003b), including the ongoing controversies among economists over
contingent legal fees creating too much litigation and the question of alloca-
tion of settlement rights (Miller, 1987; Miceli and Segerson, 1991; Thomason,
1991; Rickman, 1994; Segerson, 1994; Hay, 1997; Hadfield, 2000; Polinsky
and Rubinfeld, 2002; Choi, 2003).
Both, contingent as well as conditional fees, pay for performance by com-
pensating the lawyer by a higher fee if the case is won. The main difference
between contingent and conditional fees is that the former pays a percentage
of the judgement whereas the latter pays an upscale premium not related to
the adjudicated amount.
Previous literature, which we describe at the end of the Introduction, has
mostly addressed the use of contingent legal fees in the US, but has ignored
the possibility of conditional legal fees. As far as we know, this -together
with a companion paper (Emons 2004)- are the first attempts to provide an
efficiency-comparison between US-style contingent and UK-style conditional
fees. Here we consider the following simple principal-agent set-up. A client
hires a lawyer. After they have signed the contract, the lawyer learns the
amount of adjudication if the case is won. Then the lawyer strategically
decides how much effort she puts into the case: the more effort, the higher
the probability of winning the case. Effort is not observed by the client. If,
e.g., the lawyer were paid a fixed fee, she would provide no effort.
We find that both, contingent and conditional fees, give the lawyer an
incentive to provide effort. Under conditional fees the upscale payment is
not related to the adjudicated amount. Therefore, the lawyer’s effort does
not depend on the amount at stake. Under contingent fees the attorney gets
a fraction of the judgment. She adjusts effort to the adjudicated amount:
the higher the judgment, the more effort she puts into the case. Accordingly,
under contingent fees the attorney uses her information about the amount
at stake whereas under conditional fees she does not. Therefore, contingent
fees are more efficient than conditional fees. This holds true independently
of upfront payments to the lawyer being restricted to be non-negative or not.
Then we extend the model to the problem that under contingent but
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not under conditional fees the lawyer may have an incentive to drop the case
once she learned the amount at stake. If upfront payments are non-restricted,
the client gains from the option of dropping the case; when upfront fees are
restricted to be non-negative, the lawyer gains and the client loses.
Previous literature has addressed the use of contingent legal fees in the
US, but has overlooked the possibility of conditional legal fees. Contingent
fees may be seen as a mechanism to finance cases when the plaintiff is liquidity
constrained and capital markets are imperfect (Posner 1986, 534-540). This
observation relies on the fact that many plaintiffs do not have enough assets to
hire an attorney under a regime of hourly fees, a problem also emphasized by
those who oppose the substitution of legal aid by conditional fees in Europe
(White, 1978; Yarrow, 2001).
A second explanation sees contingent fees as a risk-sharing device (Posner
1986, 534-540). The lawyer is presumably less risk averse than the client due
to the fact that it is easier for her to diversify the risks from lawsuits. Thus,
contingent legal fees would share the risk more efficiently than hourly or
flat fees because they shift some of the risk from the more risk averse client
to the less risk averse lawyer. Another explanation is related to the use
of contingent legal fees in class-action litigation (Lynk, 1990, Klement and
Neeman, 2004) and third-party involvement in litigation, such as insurance
companies (Kirstein and Rickman, 2004).
The other explanations for contingent fees are all based on asymmetric
information between the lawyer and her client. Contingent fees can be used
to address a moral hazard problem: If the client cannot observe the attor-
ney’s effort, then tying the attorney’s fees to the trial’s outcome provides
better incentives to exert efficient effort than hourly fees which tend to in-
duce shirking (Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970; Mitchell and Schwartz, 1972;
Danzon, 1983; Halpern and Turnbull, 1983; Swanson, 1991; Gravelle and
Waterson, 1993, Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 2003).
Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) suppose that the attorney has better
information about her ability and the plaintiff has better information about
the merits of his case. A client who has a high-quality case will be willing to
pay a high fixed fee and a low contingency percentage, while a client with a
low-quality case will prefer a low fixed fee and a high contingency percentage.
In contrast, a high-quality attorney will signal her ability by working for a
4
high contingency percentage.
Dana and Spier (1993) and Emons (2000) look at the role of the attorney
as an expert. Clients do not know the merits of their case. The attorney
as the expert finds out about these merits. In Dana and Spier (1993) the
lawyer recommends whether to pursue or to drop the case; they conclude the
optimal compensation scheme will pay the attorney a share of the plaintiff’s
award. In Emons (2000) the attorney recommends how much work to put
into the case; he finds that paying the attorney by the hour is generally better
than using contingent fees.
The economic literature on conditional fees is essentially UK-based (Mac-
lean and Rickman, 1999; Yarrow, 2001; Fenn et. al, 2004) and has been
concerned with the impact on the outcome of legal cases and the effects on
the demand and supply of legal aid.
Emons (2004) compares conditional and contingent fees in a framework
where lawyers are uninformed about the clients’ cases. Payments to the
lawyer are restricted to be non-negative. Moral hazard by lawyers rules out
fixed wage components. If there is asymmetric information about the merits
of cases, in equilibrium attorneys will offer only conditional fees. If there is
asymmetric information about the risk of cases, only contingent fee contracts
are offered in equilibrium.
In the next section we describe the model and derive our results. Section
3 concludes.
2 The model
A plaintiff has been a victim of an accident or a breach of contract. He sues
the defendant to be paid damages J . With the purpose of being compensated,
he hires a lawyer. The probability of winning p depends on the unobservable
costly effort e ∈ [0, 1] exerted by the lawyer. More specifically, let p(e) =
eγ , γ ∈ (0, 1).2 We thus assume p(0) = 0, p(1) = 1, pe > 0, pee < 0,
and pe(0) = “ + ∞”. Effort increases the probability of prevailing, but at a
decreasing rate. The lower γ, the higher the marginal productivity of effort
2We work with this fairly general class of functions to have closed form solutions for
our welfare comparisons.
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for low levels of effort, and vice versa for high values of γ. For simplicity, the
attorney’s cost of effort is e.
When the case is won, the plaintiff gets J from the defendant whereas
he gets nothing when the case is lost. The amount of adjudication J is the
realization of a random variable with support [0, 1], c.d.F. G, and expected
value E(J) ∈ (0, 1).
The timing of events is as follows. When the plaintiff and the attorney
sign the contract, they know the set-up we have just described. Neither
party knows the realization J . After the lawyer has accepted the contract,
she learns the realization J . Then she decides strategically on effort e; effort
is not observed by the plaintiff. The case is then won with probability p(e)
or lost with probability (1 − p(e)) and payoffs are realized.
We study two possible fee contracts between the plaintiff and the attorney:
Definition 1 A contingent fee contract S is described by a fixed component
w plus a percentage α of the adjudicated amount J if the case is won. The
lawyer gets w if she loses and w + αJ if she wins. Formally,
S =
{
w + αJ, if the case is won;
w, if the case is lost.
Definition 2 A conditional fee contract K is given by a fixed component w
plus a upscale fee d not related to the adjudicated amount J if the case is
won. The attorney gets w if she loses and w + d if she wins. Formally,
K =
{
w + d, if the case is won;
w, if the case is lost.
The purpose of our principal-agent model is to analyze contingent and
conditional fees in solving the moral hazard problem created by the unob-
servability of the lawyer’s effort. A flat fee clearly does not align the interests
of the attorney with those of the plaintiff: under a flat fee the lawyer chooses
e = 0. Both, contingent and conditional fee contracts may mitigate moral
hazard, but not necessarily efficiently so.
Immediately we can think that the fixed component of the contract w is
an upfront flat fee and should be used to solve the participation constraint;
the contingent component (αJ) and the conditional component (d) are the
variable part of the contract that could be used to solve the incentive com-
patibility constraint. Let us now make these ideas more precise.
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Given J , the expected utility of the risk neutral attorney under contingent
fees is:
VS(J) = p(e)αJ − e + w.
The lawyer gets the fixed component w and exerts effort e in any case.
With probability p(e) the case is won and the adjudicated amount is J of
which the attorney gets the fraction α. Given J , the expected utility of the
risk neutral plaintiff under contingent fees is:
US(J) = p(e)(1 − α)J − w.
The plaintiff gets the fraction (1−α) of J and has to pay the fixed component
w independently of the outcome of the trial. The ex ante expected utilities
of the plaintiff and the lawyer are
E(US) = E(p(e)(1 − α)J) − w,
E(VS) = E(p(e)αJ − e) + w.
Given J , under conditional fees the expected utility of the attorney is :
VK(J) = p(e)d − e + w.
If the case is won, the lawyer gets the additional d, independently of the
adjudicated amount J . Given J , the expected utility of the plaintiff under
conditional fees is
UK(J) = p(e)(J − d) − w.
The ex ante expected utility of the plaintiff and the attorney are
E(UK) = E(p(e)(J − d)) − w,
E(VK) = E(p(e)d − e) + w.
Note that the ex post efficient level of effort exerted by the lawyer satisfies
peJ = 1 or in closed form e
∗(J) = (γJ)1/(1−γ). The efficient level of effort
thus increases with J : the more merit the case has, the higher should be the
attorney’s effort.3
3We measure welfare by the expected judgment minus the cost of effort, so that the
lawyer’s effort is socially valuable. Litigation is sometimes also seen as a pure rent seeking
game where resources are wasted for purely distributional purpose. See Shavell (1997) for
the fundamental divergence between the private and the social motive to litigate.
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Assume that the plaintiff’s reservation utility is zero and the lawyer’s is
v ∈ [0, E(J)). Note that lawsuits with p(e∗(J))J − e∗(J) < v should be
dropped since the expected value of the lawsuit is less than the opportunity
cost.
2.1 Perfect information
As points of reference, let us briefly consider the cases of perfect and of
imperfect but symmetric information concerning J . If both parties know
the realization of J at the time of contracting, contingent and conditional
fee contracts are equivalent. Any d = αJ will produce the same type of
incentives for the attorney to exert effort and the same risk allocation; the
only risk is losing the case which is the same for both types of contracts.
2.2 Imperfect but symmetric information
Suppose neither lawyer nor plaintiff know the realization of J at the time
the attorney chooses e; both only know the expected value of adjudication
to be E(J). The two regimes are equivalent in solving the misalignment of
objectives. Any d = αE(J) generates the same type of incentive for exerting
effort as contingent fees.
Nevertheless, the two regimes give rise to different risk allocations. Con-
tingent fees are more risky than conditional fees for the lawyer, the opposite
is true for the client.
Suppose the attorney is risk neutral and the plaintiff is risk averse. This
is typically true in the personal segment of the market for legal services
but not in the corporate segment. Then a contingent fee contract is more
efficient than a conditional fee contract: both are equally efficient in solving
the incentive problem, but the former is better in achieving efficient risk-
sharing than the latter. The opposite result will hold if lawyer is more risk
averse than plaintiff.
2.3 Imperfect and asymmetric information
Let us now return to the situation where the lawyer knows J at the time
of choosing effort but not the plaintiff. Under contingent fees the attorney
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maximizes VS with respect to e. The choice of effort will satisfy peαJ =
1 or in closed form êS = (γαJ)
1/(1−γ). Under conditional fees the lawyer
maximizes VK ; here optimal effort satisfies ped = 1 or êK = (γd)
1/(1−γ).
Under contingent fees effort e varies with J ; under conditional fees effort is
deterministic and independent of J .
2.3.1 Optimal Contracts with no restriction on upfront payments
The fixed upfront component of the salary solves the participation constraint
as in the principal-agent literature. Therefore, for contingent fee contracts
w = v − α
∫
J
(p(êS)J − êS)dG(J)
and for conditional fee contracts
w = v − (p(êK)d − êK).
Note that the lawyer agrees to the contract without knowing J . That is, in
both cases the fixed part of the contract is deterministic and independent
of J . For the time being, we assume that there is no restriction of the type
w ≥ 0, an assumption relaxed later due to the champerty doctrine in the US
and forbidden pactum cuota litis in Europe.
A risk neutral plaintiff has the following expected payoffs after solving
the participation constraint:
E(US) =
∫
J
[p(êS)J − êS)]dG(J) − v
if a contingent fee contract is agreed upon, and
E(UK) = p(êK)E(J) − êK − v.
if the fee is conditional. The plaintiff chooses the contingent fee α and the
conditional fee d so as to maximize E(US) and E(UK).
It follows immediately that the optimal choice of fee is α = 1 and d =
E(J). The rationale for the first result is that the attorney becomes the
residual claimant of the amount adjudicated: there is no problem of risk
sharing, but a high-powered incentive contract is needed to solve the moral
hazard problem. With a conditional fee it is impossible to make the choice
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of effort depend on J . Taking the average J as conditional fee implements
the average effort level.
By construction, contingent fees are necessarily more efficient than con-
ditional fees in maximizing the surplus of the contract. The lawyer’s effort
maximizing total surplus satisfies peJ = 1. Under contingent fees this is
feasible if α = 1. However, under conditional fees, this is not possible be-
cause the upscale fee is not related to the adjudicated amount and has to be
contracted before the plaintiff knows the exact value of J .
In terms of our example under a regime of conditional fees the problem
for the client is to choose d so as to maximize E(p(êK)J − êK) − v. The
optimal solution is d = E(J) and the expected payoff for the plaintiff is
E(UK) = (1 − γ)γγ/(1−γ)E(J)1/(1−γ) − v.
Under a regime of contingent fees the problem for the plaintiff is to choose
α so as to maximize E(p(êS)J − êS)− v. Therefore, α = 1 and the expected
payoff for the plaintiff is
E(US) = (1 − γ)γγ/(1−γ)E(J1/(1−γ)) − v.
Since J1/(1−γ) is strictly convex, Jensen’s inequality implies E(J1/(1−γ)) >
E(J)1/(1−γ). Accordingly, contingent fees are always better than conditional
fees. The principal’s payoff is higher whereas the agent’s payoff equals v under
both regimes. The intuition for the result is that the contingent fee contract
allows the attorney to use her informational advantage, which benefits the
plaintiff after the appropriate choice of the fixed salary. Notice that the
plaintiff chooses contingent and conditional fees to maximize the joint surplus
of the contract (since the participation constraint is solved in equality for the
attorney).
Finally, we need to check the participation constraint for the plaintiff; the
lawyer’s participation constrained is satisfied by construction. The plaintiff’s
participation constraint is satisfied for both types of fee contracts as long as
E(UK) ≥ 0 ⇔ v ≤ (1 − γ)γγ/(1−γ)E(J)1/(1−γ).
It will be not satisfied for both types if
v > (1 − γ)γγ/(1−γ)E(J1/(1−γ)).
10
For intermediate values,
E(J)1/(1−γ) < v/(1 − γ)γγ/(1−γ) ≤ E(J1/(1−γ)),
the participation constraint is satisfied for the contingent fee contract but
not for the conditional fee contract. Low valued lawsuits will not be taken to
court at all and high valued lawsuits will be taken under conditional as well
as under contingent fee contracts. For lawsuits valued in between, they will
be taken only under contingent fee but not under conditional fee contract.
We summarize the preceding observations by the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 With no restrictions on upfront payments the optimal contin-
gent fee contract entails α = 1, implementing efficient effort. The attorney
buys the case from the client at a price (−wS) > 0 which puts her on her
reservation utility v.
The optimal conditional fee contract entails d = E(J), implementing an
inefficient average effort level. The lawyer buys the case from the client at a
price (−wK) > 0 which puts her on her reservation utility v.
Whereas the lawyer is indifferent between the two regimes, the client
strictly prefers contingent fees.
2.3.2 Optimal Contracts with non-negative upfront payments
Consider now the scenario where a constraint w ≥ 0 exists. Without this
constraint we have solved the problem by finding a fixed salary that solves
the participation constraint with equality when α = 1 and d = E(J) for
contingent and conditional fee contracts respectively. Therefore, the fixed
salary is negative. The attorney effectively buys the case from the plaintiff
and if we impose w ≥ 0 this constraint actually binds for both regimes.
We solve the problem for the plaintiff when w is zero so that both con-
tingent and conditional fee contracts only have variable components.4 We
first ignore the lawyer’s participation constraint. Under conditional fees, the
4Note that with w = 0 contingent and conditional fees generate the same payoff struc-
ture as equity finance and a standard debt contract. If w > 0, conditional fess resemble a
debt contract with a collateral; see Emons (2004).
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plaintiff now maximizes p(êK)(E(J)−d). The optimal solution is d = γE(J).
The expected payoff for the client is
E(UK) = (1 − γ)γ2γ/(1−γ)E(J)1/(1−γ)
whereas the attorney get E(VK) = γE(UK).
Under a regime of contingent fees, the client maximizes E((1−α)p(êS)J).
The optimal solution is α = γ and the expected payoff for the client is
E(US) = (1 − γ)γ2γ/(1−γ)E(J1/(1−γ)).
The attorney get E(VS) = γE(US).
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Note that plaintiff and lawyer do better under contingent fees because
E(J1/(1−γ)) > E(J)1/(1−γ). Under contingent fees the attorney uses the in-
formation she has about J when choosing effort whereas under conditional
fees she does not.
First note that the plaintiff’s participation constraint is always satisfied.
Next we need to check that the participation constraint for the lawyer is
satisfied in both cases. That is the case as long as E(VK) ≥ v. Let us
assume that this condition is satisfied with strict inequality in order not to
solve the model with a binding lawyer’s participation constraint.6
Under both contracts the attorney obviously does better in the second
scenario with w = 0 than in first scenario without this restriction where he
gets exactly her reservation utility v. For the plaintiff the opposite is true.
Under both contracts the joint surplus is smaller in the second scenario than
in the first one; the lawyer gets more. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s expected
surplus is less if w = 0 than if we allow for negative upfront payments. This
is a standard result for second-best contracts. Effort is distorted downwards
because the principal faces the trade-off of reducing the agent’s rent versus
providing incentives. To summarize:
5The higher is γ, the more high-powered are the incentive schemes under both set of
fees and the higher the lawyer’s share of the surplus. To achieve the same level of p, e has
to be higher the higher γ. Accordingly, incentives have to be stronger the higher γ.
6If the participation constraint binds, the optimal α > γ and d > γE(J) so as to
guarantee v for the attorney. Effort will go up, but the client will do worse because his
share is lower.
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Proposition 2 Suppose E(VK) > v. If w ≥ 0, the optimal contingent fee
contract entails α = γ, implementing inefficiently low effort. The lawyer
does better than his reservation utility v.
The optimal conditional fee contract entails d = γE(J), implementing an
inefficient average effort level. The attorney does better than v.
Both, client and lawyer, strictly prefer contingent to conditional fees.
Whereas the attorney is better off with the restriction w ≥ 0, the opposite
holds true for the client.
Notice however that the superiority of contingent fees in terms of efficiency
has been obtained under the assumption that both players are risk neutral.
Once we allow for the possibility that the plaintiff is less risk averse than
the attorney, the result we have obtained does not necessarily hold. In the
opposite case, our result is of course reinforced.
2.4 Imperfect and asymmetric information when the
lawyer can drop the case
In the previous section we have assumed that the participation constraint is
solved before the attorney learns the realization J . Once J is revealed, the
lawyer is stuck with the contract and she can only adjust her effort. The
attorney cannot drop the case. Yet, under contingent fees if J is small, the
lawyer prefers to drop the case and earn v with the outside opportunity to
investing êS and earn the (miserable) p(êS)αJ − êS.
To be more precise, we assume that the lawyer can drop the case at zero
cost once she discovers the true value of J and before effort is chosen. The
rule of “no damages” thus applies.
First note that under conditional fees the attorney has no incentive to
drop the case because her payoff p(êK)d − êk is independent of J .
Now consider contingent fees. The first scenario where the lawyer buys
the case from the client is simple. Once the attorney learns that she better
works elsewhere, she simply drops the case; her payment of w is sunk at the
time. This new option makes working on the case more attractive for the
lawyer. If J is low, she turns to her alternative job and gets v. This in turn
allows the client to increase the price (−wS) the lawyer has to pay for the
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case. The attorney is indifferent as to whether she can drop the case or not;
the client strictly prefers the latter option.
Next consider the second scenario with w = 0. If p(êS)αJ − êS < v, the
lawyer drops the case and earns v elsewhere. Define Ĵ to satisfy p(êS(Ĵ))αĴ−
êS(Ĵ) = v. In terms of the example Ĵ = (v/(1−γ))(1−γ)1/(αγγ). Accordingly,
for J ≥ Ĵ the attorney performs and for J < Ĵ she drops the case.
The lawyer’s expected utility is
E(VS) = v
∫ Ĵ
0
dG(J) +
∫ 1
Ĵ
[p(êS)αJ − êS]dG(J) > v.
The plaintiff’s expected utility is
E(US) =
∫ 1
Ĵ
[p(êS)(1 − α)J ]dG(J).
Increasing α now has two effects on the lawyer’s behavior: As in the
preceding scenario it increases the attorney’s effort. Moreover, now we have
the additional effect that increasing α increases the performance set [Ĵ , 1].
Raising α lowers Ĵ , the judgement rendering the lawyer indifferent between
pursuing and dropping the contract. Consequently, the optimal α will exceed
γ, the optimal value if the lawyer cannot drop the case. We may, therefore,
conclude that the option of dropping the case makes the attorney certainly
better off: whenever J is low, she turns to the outside job; when J is high,
she earns more on the case because α is higher. The client is certainly worse
off. When J is low, he gets nothing because the case is dropped. When
stakes are high he gets a lower share.
When the attorney can drop the case, the joint surplus is higher under
contingent than under conditional fees: under contingent fees the lawyer uses
this option whereas under conditional fees she does not. The lawyer is better
off under contingent fees. Whether the client does better under contingent
than under conditional fees cannot be answered without specifying the c.d.F.
G.
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3 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed UK-style conditional and US-style contingent
fees with respect to the incentives they give the attorney to work hard. Under
contingent fees the attorney’s effort is tied to the amount at stake; under
conditional fees the effort choice is independent of the judgment. Because
the attorney effectively uses her information about the adjudicated amount,
contingent fees are more efficient than conditional fees. This holds true if
upfront payments to the lawyer are restricted to be non-negative or not. To
put it differently: Looking at incentives, contingent fees are clearly better
because the agent with more information becomes residual claimant.
Conditional fees lead to more efficient risk-sharing if the plaintiff is less
risk averse than the lawyer. This seems to be true in the corporate segment
of the market for legal services, essentially contract and property litigation.
This seems not be the case in the personal segment of the market, that is,
personal injury litigation. Thus, for the personal segment we may conclude
that contingent fees are better for incentives and for risk sharing. However,
in the corporate segment conditional fees could be better than contingent fees
because the superior risk-allocation may outweigh the inferior incentives.
Our model suggests that conditional fees could do also better than hourly
and flat fees in the corporate market by providing a compromise between risk-
sharing and incentives, saving on the need for in-house counsel to monitor
external lawyers and reduce moral hazard. Such a result seems to be sup-
ported by the observation that in the US many large law firms do operate on
the basis of flat fee plus bonus for performance, rather than contingent legal
fees (Kritzer, 1990).
Our conjectures, if correct, also indicate that if at some point contin-
gent legal fees are allowed for in Europe, they would replace conditional fees
in personal litigation if providing incentives is the main issue. If, however,
asymmetric information about the merits of cases is the major problem, con-
ditional fees will be preferred over contingent fees (Emons 2004). Hopefully,
the possible introduction of contingent legal fees in the Netherlands will pro-
vide the natural experiment.
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